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THE EXISTENTIAL SUBJECT OF RIGHTS
AND PRIVATE LAW:  THE EXAMPLE
OF THE INDIAN ISSUE IN BRAZIL*
Jose´ Carlos Moreira da Silva Filho**
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of the juridical subject has been a topic of discussion as part of
the rethinking of the classical jurisprudential concepts in Brazil.  In particular,
some authors have written about the “repersonalization of private law.”1  This
has opened a promising path of inquiry regarding the legal subject for at least
four major reasons.  First, continental private law is the classical field to dis-
cuss the subject of rights.  Second, the focus of private law remains the concept
* This Article is part of my larger research project, “The Human Person and Subject of
Rights in Private Jural Relations:  Identity and Alterity,” which was funded by Universidade
do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS).
This Article is a revised and amplified translation of Jose´ Carlos Moreira da Silva Filho,
A Repersonalizac¸a˜o do Direito Civil em uma sociedade de indivı´duos:  o exemplo da
questa˜o indı´gena no Brasil, in CONSTITUIC¸ ˜AO, SISTEMAS SOCIAIS E HERMEN ˆEUTICA [THE
CONSTITUTION, SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND HERMENEUTIC]  277-94 (Lenio Luiz Streck & Jose´
Luiz Bolzan de Morais eds., 2008).  I want to thank Professor Francis J. Mootz III of The
William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas for his very helpful
comments and revising of my initial translation of the published Article, and so the current
Article likely is substantially different in form (but not in substance) from the original.
** Professor in the Post-Graduate Program in Criminal Sciences (Pontifı´cia Universidade
Cato´lica do Rio Grande do Sul–PUCRS).  Professor da Silva received his bachelor’s degree
in law from Universidade de Brası´lia (UnB), his master’s degree in theory and philosophy of
law at Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC), and his doctorate in the law of social
relations from Universidade Federal do Parana (UFPR).  He is also a counselor to the
Brazilian Amnesty Commission of the Justice Ministry.  He may be reached at josecarlos
filho@terra.com.br.
1 In order to explain the concept, Paulo Luiz Neto Lobo argues that,
the patrimonialization of the private relations in the Codes is incompatible with the dignity of the
human person, which has been recognized by the modern constitutions, including that of Brazil-
ian(art. 1, III).  Repersonalization is a step in the long history of human emancipation by putting
the human person at the core of private law.  Patrimony plays a second-order role which is not
always needed. . . . The challenge to private law scholars is to achieve the ability to see all
persons in their ontological dimension, and to see their patrimony through this dimension as
well.  It is necessary to materialize the subjects of rights, who are more than just property own-
ers.  The recovery of the primacy of the human person in private relations is the first step in
adjusting law to reality and to the ground of constitutionalism.
Paulo Luiz Netto Loˆbo, Constitucionalizac¸a˜o do direito civil [Private Law Constitutional-
ization], 141 REVISTA DE INFORMAC¸ ˜AO LEGISLATIVA [R.I.L.] 99, 103 (1999) (Braz.) (trans-
lated for this Article by Moreira da Silva Filho).  For more details and explanations
concerning the theme of repersonalization of private Law in the legal context, see Jose´ Car-
los Moreira da Silva Filho, The Human Person and Objective Good Faith in Contract Rela-
tions, 25 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 405 (2006).
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of the person, opening an important space to recover the moral philosophy in
law.  Third, the repersonalization of private law demonstrates the necessity of
going further than modern natural law theorists in the discussion of the concept
of person, and philosophical hermeneutics provides guidance for contemplating
the human person’s concrete, historical and relational dimension.  Finally, this
direction has affinities with the new constitutional law that seeks to change
society and improve the republican and communal features of civic life.
This Article discusses these four aspects, guided by a specific and peculiar
Brazilian issue:  the rights of indigenous persons.  This issue provides a privi-
leged point of view to discuss juridical subjectivity.  The analysis will draw
from the theoretical approach of Martin Heidegger’s philosophical hermeneu-
tics to frame a discussion of the interpretation of the Brazilian Constitution
regarding indigenous rights.
This discussion will demonstrate that modern developments in the Brazil-
ian Constitution have changed the paradigm for analyzing indigenous rights,
and that individuals should understand and further develop this paradigm in
order to recognize and respect the alterity of the indigenous peoples.
II. THE VALLADOLID DEBATE ABOUT THE HUMANITY OF INDIANS
Regarded from within “the white and civilized western man” paradigm,
indigenous Indians in Brazil are less than real subjects.  They are incapable of
being the protagonists of their own history.  From this point of view, there are
two possibilities:  (1) the Indians are not human beings; or (2) they are like
children and need guardianship.  As to the first case, it is helpful to recall the
Valladolid debate in 1550 between Juan Gine´s de Sepu´lveda and Bartolome´ de
Las Casas, which is usually neglected in the narratives and studies about the
appearance and development of the modern subject.2  According to Todorov,
2 Enrique Dussel argues that a history of the modern subject that does not consider its outly-
ing context is, at best, partial and incomplete.  The Argentinean philosopher accuses Charles
Taylor of making this error in THE SOURCES OF THE SELF.  Dussel claims that the book,
[I]s written with mastery, with great knowledge and a creative way to obtain new results, but it is
only an intraphilosophical journey.  There is a lack of a history, an economy and a political
perspective.  This methodological limitation prevents the author from reaching more critical
results.  It seems that capitalism, colonialism, and the continuous utilization of violence or mili-
tary aggression don’t have any importance.
ENRIQUE DUSSEL, ´ETICA DA LIBERTAC¸ ˜AO NA IDADE DA GLOBALIZAC¸ ˜AO E DA EXCLUS ˜AO
[L IBERATION ETHICS–IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION AND EXCLUSION] 67 (Ephraim Ferreira
et al. trans., 2000) (translated for this Article by Moreira da Silva Filho).  By considering
only the European context and the principal European thinkers in order to identify the
sources of the modern subject, Taylor engaged in “eurocentrism.”  Dussel says:
The ‘eurocentrism’ consists exactly in constituting as a human abstract universality in general
moments of the European particularity, which is the first world particularity indeed (in other
words, the first human concrete universality).  Culture, civilization, philosophy, subjectivity, etc.
from modern Europe have been taken as the culture, the civilization, the philosophy, the subjec-
tivity, etc., with no other [human universal abstract].  A great portion of the benefits of moder-
nity didn’t come exclusively from European exclusive creativity.  They came from a continuous
dialetic (impact and counter-impact) between Europe and its periphery, even in the constitution
of the modern subjectivity as itself.
Id. at 69.  However, one must concede that Taylor does not sustain this kind of eurocentrism.
His main argument is precisely to make clear that the modern self is a product of the modern
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this debate occurred because Gine´s de Sepu´lveda, a well-know scholar at the
time, did not obtain permission to publish his treatise favoring the waging of a
“just war” against the Indians.3  Sepu´lveda asked for a hearing before a board
of jurists, theologians, and experts.  Bartolome´ de Las Casas, a Dominican
friar, offered to support the opposite thesis.  He is now well-known for his
strong and vehement defense of the Indian cause throughout his whole life.  Las
Casas’ vehemence is clear in his writings4 and is the direct result of his own
experience as the chaplain of Spanish expeditions (at the time of the debate, he
had been in America for almost half a century), in which he testified about the
massacre and extermination of amazed and defenseless villages.
It took a mere three hours to read Sepu´lveda’s treatise, but the Las Casas
reading5 lasted approximately five days!  Sepu´lveda argued that the Indians
were inferior and cited to Aristotle’s arguments about the nature of slaves.6
Sepu´lveda was an expert on Aristotle’s philosophy, and had translated several
of Aristotle’s works into Latin, including THE POLITICS.  He sustained the “nat-
European context rather than an abstract and universal concept.  Dussel’s claim must be
credited with recognizing the determinant role of a new world periphery (the “New World”)
with regard to Europe just as, before that, as Dussel argues, Europe was a periphery of the
leadership of the Muslim world.
Some of the topics that characterize modern European thought were engendered by the
relationship between Europeans and Indigenous peoples.  Lewis Hanke observes, writing
about Spanish America, that,
[t]he Laws of Burgos in 1512, and their clarification in 1513, were the first fruits of the 1511
sermons of Montesinos.  But they were only a beginning.  Other Spanish thinkers, now that the
problem had been brought to their attention, began to wonder whether Spain, after all, held just
title to the Indies.  These thinkers wrote treatises in which they went far beyond the dispute at
Burgos on the proper laws to be drawn up for the benefit of the Indians.  They concerned them-
selves with basic political issues precipitated by the discovery of America, and thereby helped to
work out fundamental laws governing the relationships between nations, over a century before
Grotius published his study On the Freedom of the Seas.
LEWIS HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA 25
(Southern Methodist Univ. Press 2002) (1949).  Similarly, Dussel observes that the instru-
mental domain of nature in Cartesian philosophy had already been preceded by the conquest
of the New World.  He writes,
the ego cogito, as we saw, already says something about a previous history from the sixteenth
century, which expresses itself in Descartes’ ontology, but did not come from nowhere. The ego
conquiro (I conquer), as a “practical self,” came before it.  Hernaˆn Corteˆs, in 1521, preceded The
Discourse of the Method (1636) by more than one century.  Descartes studied in La Fle´che, a
Jesuit school, a religious order that was widely implanted in America, Asia and Africa at this
time.  Additionally, Descartes was in Amsterdam since 1629.  However, the “barbarian” was not
considered as the proper context for thinking about subjectivity, reason, cogito.
DUSSEL, supra note 2, at 69.
3 TZVETAN TODOROV, THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA:  THE QUESTION OF THE OTHER 151-52
(Richard Howard trans., Harper Perennial 1992) (1982).
4 For example, see the impressive reports contained in a pamphlet written by Las Casas and
published for the first time in 1552 in Seville: BARTOLOM ´E DE LAS CASAS, THE DEVASTA-
TION OF THE INDIES:  A BRIEF ACCOUNT  (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1992).
5 The 550 pages in Latin, distributed in 63 chapters, were called Argumentum Apologiae.
HANKE, supra note 2, at 118.
6 Hanke pointedly argues that the claim that a social group deserves to be subjugated
through war and violence on account of its barbarity is always presented as part of imperial-
ist and colonizing actions. Id. at 121-22.
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ural” inferiority of the Indians when compared to the “rationality” of the
Spanish.7
Sepulveda anticipated by more than a century John Locke’s argument that
there could be a legitimate divestiture of indigenous lands.  According to
Locke, the North-American Indians did not use their lands in a rational way;
they did not obey God’s natural law, which had forbidden the waste of private
property (since they did not “use” all their lands).  By persisting in this disobe-
dience, the Indians thereby authorized the English conqueror to usurp their
property.8  Sepu´lveda recommended the usurpation of indigenous properties by
applying just war theory, given their crudeness and inferiority.  The fact that
the Indians did not embrace Western notions of ownership and property was
regarded as a sign of their inferiority.  They did not have private property and
they did not manage the goods in an autonomous and free way; instead, they
submitted everything to their king.9
Las Casas, on the other hand, boldly asserted that Sepulveda, despite his
notoriety as an expert on Aristotle, had misunderstood Aristotle’s theory of
slavery.  Las Casas argued that, for Aristotle, there were three types of barbari-
ans:  those who had strange attitudes and opinions, but had a decent way of life
and were capable of ruling themselves; those who had no writing; and those
who were rude, primitive, lived without rules and were like wild beasts.  Only
7 In Sepu´lveda’s words:
And then, in only one man one can see the soul’s empire over body, the civil and royal power
that understanding and reason have over the appetite.  One can see clearly that it is natural and
fair that the soul dominates the body, that reason presides over instinct.  If the priority were
reversed it would be pernicious.  There is a rule of order based on this principle, which is why
beasts are domesticated under men’s empire, why men rule over women, adult over child, the
father over his children, the powerful and the more perfect over the weak and the imperfect.  One
can verify this principle even between men; there are some men that are master by nature and
others that are servant by nature.
JUAN GIN ´ES DE SEP ´ULVEDA, DEM ´OCRATES SEGUNDO, O, DE LAS JUSTAS CAUSAS DE LA
GUERRA CONTRA LOS INDIOS (2d ed. 1984) (translated for this Article by Moreira da Silva
Filho).
8 This argument is developed in greater detail in Franz J. Hinkelammert, La inversio´n de los
derechos humanos: el caso de John Locke [The inversion of human rights: the case of John
Locke], in JOAQU´IN HERRERA FLORES ET AL., EL VUELO DE ANTEO:  DERECHOS HUMANOS Y
CR´ITICA DE LA RAZ ´ON LIBERAL [THE FLY OF ANTEO—HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CRITICS OF
LIBERAL REASON] 79-113 (2000); Jose´ Carlos Moreira da Silva Filho, John Locke, in
DICION ´ARIO DE FILOSOFIA DO DIREITO [DICTIONARY OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY] 541-45
(Vicente de Paulo Barretto ed., 2006).
9 Sepu´lveda wrote:
Some have said that the inhabitants from New Spain and Mexico Province are the most civilized
of all.  They boast of their public institutions, because they have cities built rationally and kings
are elected by popular vote rather than hereditary, and they have modern trade.  But I disagree
with this assessment, seeing in those institutions the proof of the rudeness, barbarism and innate
slavery of those men.  Having houses, a rational way of living, and some kind of trade have
naturally developed and only serve to prove that they are not bears, or monkeys, and not totally
devoid of reason.  But, on the other hand, they have established their republic such that no
individual owns anything, because everything is under the power and control of their so-called
kings, under whose discretion they live, attentive to their will and whim, and not to their own
liberty.  That this has been achieved not by the power of weapons but by a voluntary and sponta-
neous resignation is a certain sign of the servile and depressed mood of those barbarians.
Sepu´lveda, supra note 7.
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barbarians from the third type were slaves by nature, and Las Casas insisted
that the Indians were not barbaric in this way.10  Las Casas provided extended
reports about the Indians’ clothing and various aspects of their lives.  In these
reports he emphasizes the virtuous and rational characteristics of their society:
beauty, good government, housekeeping, good feelings, religiousness, etc.
Such features were superior even among the ancient people:  the temples of
Yucata˜ were more admirable than the pyramids of Egypt; religiousness was
deeper than among the Greeks and Romans; and they educated and raised their
children in a better manner.
Although the Board never rendered a judgment, Las Casas published and
spoke as he wished during his life.  Sepulveda, however, never obtained per-
mission to publish his treatise, which only appeared in print in 1892.  Neverthe-
less, after a brief interruption, the Spanish conquests continued and the proper
application of just war theory even today has never been properly resolved.11
III. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA AND THE THESIS OF INDIGENOUS INFANTILITY
In addition to Las Casas, there are other great defenders of indigenous
rights, who tried to stop Spanish greed and violence with their words.  Among
them, the Dominican Francisco de Vitoria is well-known, although he died
some years before the notorious debate of Valladolid.  In his writings he argued
that war against Indians could not be waged indiscriminately.  Neither the pope
nor the emperor could impose their laws and dominion without fair grounds.
Vitoria rejected the argument that, because the emperor is the lord of all lands,
or because the pope holds temporal power, that either could authorize a just war
against the Indians.
Vitoria is one of the early precursors of the theory of international law.
His conception of international law regarded it as unlawful for indigenous peo-
ples to impede free access to their land by the Spanish, unless the Spanish
caused harm to them.  It was necessary to maintain an international law of
reciprocity that would facilitate the trade between different nations.12  On the
other hand, the Spanish could also legitimately wage war against indigenous
10 As Hanke well observes, it is incorrect to assume that Las Casas admitted the possibility
that some men were slaves by nature.  Las Casas, indeed, searched for a strategic line of
argument that would not contradict Aristotle’s undisputed authority at that time.  It was also
a great strategy to fight the opposite arguments on their own terms. HANKE, supra note 2, at
123-25.
11 Despite continuation of the “just war” justification, there is an important consequence
that one can take from the episode of Valladolid:
[W]hen Las Casas spoke at Valladolid for the American Indians his argumentation had another
usefulness:  it strengthened the hands of all those who in his time and in the centuries to follow
worked in the belief that all the peoples of the world are human beings with the potential and
responsibilities of men.
Id. at 132.
12 In his first two propositions on the justification of the war against the indigenous peoples,
published in his famous work, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES, Vito´ria writes the
following:
[I]t was permissible from the beginning of the world (when everything was in common) for any
one to set forth and travel wheresoever he would.  Now this was not taken away by the division
of property, for it was never the intention of peoples to destroy by that division the reciprocity
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peoples to save the ones who were condemned to human sacrifices or cannibal
rituals and, also, to protect those who had been converted to the Christian faith
and now required protection against their own kings.
The most significant aspect of Vitoria’s arguments is that he does not
regard the Indians as wild and inhumane beasts, but rather as men with little
education and who are trapped in an infantile stage of social development.  It
would be a matter of Christian charity to instruct them, to govern them and to
impose on them a Guardianship for their own good.13  It was this perspective
and common user which prevailed among men, and indeed in the days of Noah it would have
been inhumane to do so.
. . .
The Spaniards may carry on trade among the native Indians, so long as they do no harm to
their country, as, for instance, by importing the goods which the natives lack and by exporting
thence either gold or silver or other wares of which the natives have abundance.  Neither may the
native princes hinder their subjects from carrying on trade with the Spanish; nor, on the other
hand, may the princes of Spain prevent commerce with the natives.
Francisco de Vitori, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES [INDIANS AND LAW OF WAR] :
Os ı´ndios e o direito da guerra 94-96 (2006) (translated for this Article by Moreira da Silva
Filho).
13 In DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES, Vitoria describes what would be the last
justification or title by which the Spanish claimed to wage war legitimately against the native
Indians.  Vitoria did not wholly support this position, but, in any event, he contributed to the
dissemination of the idea.  In addition, his conviction regarding the Indians’ inferiority is
revealed in other passages throughout the text.  His proposition is as follows:
There is another title which can indeed not be asserted, but brought up for discussion, and some
think it a lawful one.  I dare not affirm it at all, nor do I entirely condemn it.  It is this:  Although
the aborigines in question are (as has been said above) not wholly unintelligent, yet they are little
short of that condition, and so are unfit to found or administer a lawful State up to the standard
required by human and civil claims.  Accordingly they have no proper laws nor magistrates, and
are not even capable of controlling their family affairs; they are without any literature or arts, not
only the liberal arts, but the mechanical arts also; they have no careful agriculture and no arti-
sans; and they lack many other conveniences, yea necessaries, of human life.  It might, therefore,
be maintained that in their own interests the sovereigns of Spain might undertake the administra-
tion of their country, providing them with prefects and governors for their towns, and might even
give them new lords, so long as this was clearly for their benefit.  I say there would be some
force in this contention; for if they were all wanting in intelligence, there is no doubt that this
would not only be a permissible, but also a highly proper, course to take; nay, our sovereigns
would be bound to take it, just as if the natives were infants.  The same principle seems to apply
here to them as to people of defective intelligence; and indeed they are no whit or little better
than such so far as self-government is concerned, or even than the wild beasts, for their food is
not more pleasant and hardly better than that of beasts.  Therefore their governance should in the
same way be entrusted to people of intelligence.  There is clear confirmation hereof, for if by
some accident of fortune all their adults were to perish and there were to be left boys and youths
in enjoyment, indeed, of a certain amount of reason, but of tender years and under the age of
puberty, our sovereigns would certainly be justified in taking charge of them and governing them
so long as they were in that condition.  Now, this being admitted, it appears undeniable that the
same could be done in the case of their barbarian parents, if they be supposed to be of that
dullness of mind which is attributed to them by those who have been among them and which is
reported to be more marked among them than even among the boys and youths of other nations.
And surely this might be founded on the precept of charity, they being our neighbors and we
being bound to look after their welfare.  Let this, however, as I have already said, be put forward
without dogmatism and subject also to the limitation that any such interposition be for the wel-
fare and in the interests of the Indians and not merely for the profit of the Spaniards.
Id. at 94-96.
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that spread and ultimately largely dictated the way in which western civiliza-
tion understood and dealt with the indigenous peoples.
Vitoria’s thesis provided the legal basis for the wars against the indige-
nous peoples,14 but his conception of Indians as infants produced the broader
idea that Indians do not possess the full capacity to exercise the acts of civilian
life, that they require the Guardianship of the State because of their relative or
total incapacity, and that they will reach full legal capacity and become the
subjects of right only when they are fully integrated to (Western) civilization.
IV. THE THEME OF GUARDIANSHIP IN THE HISTORY OF BRAZILIAN POLICY
REGARDING INDIGENOUS PERSONS
Until the Constitution of 1988, the main characteristic of Brazilian policy
toward indigenous persons was to regard them as infants who required guardi-
anship.  Rosane Freire Lacerda15 indicates that this policy began in 1750, when
Pombal’s administration initiated the transition of indigenous workers from
slavery to wage earner status.
The legislation of the time purported to prohibit indigenous slavery, but it
established a series of restrictions on Indians’ legal capacity.16  This approach
grew stronger after Brazil became independent.17  The imperial government
persisted in its anti-miscegenation policy, land dispossession, and the constant
presence of non-indigenous peoples in the aldeamentos (a spanish word which
indicates a territorial area established and ruled by the government in order to
gather and keep the natives under control).  The government also seized tradi-
14 Todorov highlights this point:  “We are accustomed to seeing Vitoria as a defender of
Indians; but if we question, not the subject’s intentions, but the impact of his discourse, it is
clear that his role is quite different:  under cover of an international law based on reciprocity,
he in reality supplies a legal basis to the wars of colonization which had hitherto had none
(none which, in any case, might withstand serious consideration).” TODOROV, supra note 3,
at 150.
15 In her brilliant master’s dissertation, Rosane Freire Lacerda highlights, through documen-
tary and historical research, that this policy was the main orientation, although not the only
one, for public policies since the colonial period throughout the periods of Tome´ de Souza,
Men de Sa´, Felipe III, Marqueˆs de Pombal, D. Maria I, Jose´ Bonifa´cio de Andrada e Silva,
D. Pedro I, imperial regency, D. Pedro II, and even during the Republican period.  As we
will see, this direction changes with the Brazilian Constitution of 1988.  Rosane Freire
Lacerda, Diferenc¸a na˜o e´ incapacidade – o mito da tutela indı´gena (Apr. 9, 2007) (unpub-
lished M.A. dissertation, University of Brasilia) (on file with author).
16 A law from June 6, 1755 prohibited the enslavement of Indians, but also, “determined a
punishment for those who, abusing the imbecility of the Indians, violated their territorial
rights.  In order to be successful with their civilization, they would be assimilated to agricul-
tural practices, in the expectation that their relations with the inhabitants of seafaring places
for the trade of such products would contribute to the abandonment of their barbaric habits.
In addition, the Governor and the General Captain had to take care of their civilian instruc-
tion, and, at the same time, preserve their freedom and their goods and trade.”  Lacerda,
supra note 15, at 42.
17 Rosane Freire Lacerda clarifies that the imperial legislation makes a distinction between
Indians who were capable and integrated to civilization and Indians who lived in a “primi-
tive” stage.  Only the latter would be a target for guardianship.  However, these distinctions
were very nebulous in practice, and there were no established criterions for engaging in this
type of guardianship.  The consequence was that guardianship reached all Indians indis-
tinctly. Id. at 50.
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tional indigenous lands as soon as they became empty with the forced migra-
tion of their original inhabitants.  These policies led to the extermination of
several native peoples and caused huge territorial losses to the survivors of
other indigenous communities.
The republican Constitution of 1891, as well as the imperial Constitution,
did not mention indigenous peoples.  In this silence, the path of assimilation
and guardianship continued to be the practice.  Decrees and laws were enacted
with the purpose of promoting the “catechesis and civilization of indians.”
This spirit sustained the “Servic¸o de Protec¸a˜o aos ´Indios e Localizac¸a˜o de
Trabalhadores Nacionais – SPILTN” (Indian Protection and National Worker
Localization Service), created in 1910 and commanded by General Caˆndido
Mariano Rondon.
The Brazilian Civil Code of 1916 confirmed the policy of guardianship of
indigenous peoples by putting them in a kind of permanent limbo concerning
their juridical subjectivity.  The Code determined in its sixth article that the
forester [indigenous people] are relatively incapable of certain acts and some
practices.  The single paragraph of this article also provides that the “forester
will be subjected to guardianship, established by especial laws and regulations,
which will cease as soon as they became adapted to the civilization of the
country.”18
The especial regulation came in 1928 with Decree 5.484, which estab-
lished a public policy of protection and incorporation of indigenous peoples to
society.  The assimilation ideal was clear, as well, in the successive Brazilian
Constitutions:  1934, 1946, 1967 and 1969.  As a culmination of this process, in
1973 the legislature enacted Law Nº 6001, well known as the “Indian Statute,”
which regulated the guardianship prescribed in the civil code for indigenous
peoples.  At this point, the Indian National Foundation (FUNAI) was the public
agency responsible for the implementation of guardianship.  The agency was
established in 1967 to be in charge of the administration of indigenous proper-
ties and of their juridical representation, juridical assistance and education in
order to assimilate them to national society.  The goal of assimilation was rein-
forced in the first article of the Indian Statute, which provided that the statute
“regulates the juridical situation of Indians or foresters and the indigenous com-
munities, with the purpose of preserving their culture and integrating them pro-
gressively and harmoniously into the national community.”19  Once this
integration occurred, the statute provides that the land occupied by indigenous
peoples would be given to the State.
This brief overview of Brazilian indigenous policy makes clear that indig-
enous peoples were always considered in an assimilative way.  This account,
which is part of the ethnocentric trend in Western culture, does not pay atten-
tion to the alterity of indigenous people, and instead considers them as inferior
(undeveloped) persons.  Law, as a result of this same culture, seeks to speak in
universal, standardized and abstract concepts, which makes it very difficult to
18 Co´digo Civil [C.C.] art. 6(III) (1916) (Braz.).
19 Lei No. 6.001, de 19 de dezembro de 1973 Artigo 1º [The Indian Statute] (Braz.) (trans-
lated for this Article by Moreira da Silva Filho).
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deal with plurality and difference.  Against this historical backdrop we can now
consider the issues relating to the classical concept of the subject of legal rights.
V. A BRIEF ITINERARY OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN MEANING OF
THE CONCEPT OF SUBJECT OF RIGHTS
Modern western law is premised on an abstract, universal, and rational
human person who bears legal rights and therefore is a subject.  This category
emerges from modern natural law theory, which clearly distinguished the
human person as a moral being, who is the bearer of rights and obligations, and
who is not solely a bio-physiological individual.20  According to a well-known
thesis by Michel Villey, this thesis precedes modern natural law, and is rooted
in the thought of William of Ockham.21
Villey explains that the great dispute to which Ockham directed his efforts
was the result of Pope John XXII’s thesis that the Franciscans, guided by their
vow of poverty, could not relinquish property rights by claiming that they
merely held possessions for the maintenance of the religious order, but not as
an assertion of the right of property over them.  The pope, a jurist with an
education in classical Roman law, attributed to the Latin word jus its traditional
meaning, that is, the fair share of possessions, departing from the idea of a
natural order rationally established.  This reasoning led to the conclusion that
the Franciscan friars, who made use of the church’s possessions, held rights of
property over these possessions.
Ockham, who had no formal studies in law and knew very little about
classical Roman law, altered the traditional meaning of the word jus. Instead
of relating it to an impersonal order, from which a fair rational share belongs to
each human being, he associated it to the notion of potestas.  Thus, from the
absolute power of God derives, through his delegation, the power of each indi-
vidual.  Such power indicates a modern notion of subjective right, revealing, in
the first place, a faculty of each individual through which she can use this
power or not.  In addition to granting such power of individual ownership, God
also has conceded to human persons the power of electing leaders who deter-
mine the limits for the exercising property rights within society, leading to the
origination of the state, and with it, the creation of human laws (the objective
law), which essentially guarantee that property holders may access justice.  The
Franciscans renounced this last type of right, based on their individual potestas.
Villey argues that this initiates the saga of modern Western law, structured on
the notion of subjective right and the subject of rights.22  The Christian roots of
20 YVES CHARLES ZARKA, L’AUTRE VOIE DE LA SUBJECTIVIT ´E:  SIX ´ETUDES SUR LE SUJET
ET LE DROIT NATUREL AU XVIIE SI `ECLE [THE OTHER ROUTE FOR SUBJECTIVITY:  SIX STUD-
IES ABOUT THE SUBJECT AND NATURAL LAW IN THE 17TH CENTURY]  5-31 (2000).
21 MICHEL VILLEY, A FORMAC¸ ˜AO DO PENSAMENTO JUR´IDICO MODERNO [THE FORMATION
OF MODERN LEGAL THOUGHT]  265-88 (2005).
22 Commenting on the semantic reversal in Ockham’s philosophy, Villey observes that,
adding the cultivated  latin term jur to the vulgar, medieval, Christian notion of power of the
individual elevated that notion to the world of the scholars (starting with philosophers and theo-
logians), and then transmitted to the science of Civil Law, foreshadowing the immense work of
modern Roman law which, on this basis, would twist law upside down and turn it into a system
of subjective rights. . . . We are in a “Copernican” moment of the history of the science of Law,
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this development also highlight a universalizing trend of thought regarding the
human person and its consequent legal projection as a member of universal
citizenship.
Yves Charles Zarka surveyed his pre-modern antecessors, and concluded
that the concept of subject of rights was an invention of the jusnaturalistic mod-
ern thought as developed by Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke and
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.23  It is especially through Hugo Grotius that the
sedimentation of a notion of right, based on the idea of subject of rights and on
the predominance of a laic universalism, becomes more visible.  For Zarka,
Grotius takes a decisive step when, in the context of rational24 natural law, he
conceives the right as a moral quality of human persons.  Such quality, in turn,
indicates a facultas or a power,25 a notion that reinforces the central concept of
subjective right, founded on the human person and her autonomy.
However, if Grotius highlights the moral quality of law, he does not con-
centrate his attention on those who have this quality, that is, the person.  It is
John Locke who attends to the moral condition of a person.  In his famous
work, Essay on Human Understanding, one of the crucial issues he addresses is
the delimitation of personal identity.  This identity is not solely the identifica-
tion of a physical individual; it is the demarcation of a relation between her
with herself based on the conscience formed by the memory and the thought.
In other words, the identity of a person is delimited by her acts and thoughts,
which are unified by the memory of a conscience in relation to herself.  Even in
the farthest past, in which one can extend her memory over her own thoughts
and actions, it is possible to acknowledge her identity.  Such conscience is what
constitutes the person, a thinking being that is conscious of her acts and
thoughts, and that, due to this fact can be liable, punished or rewarded accord-
ing to the context.26  The instrumental character of the person is, in this case,
perceptible,27 since the person makes use of rationality in seeking higher goods
on the border of two worlds:  A new social order from which the individual right will be the
ultimate touchpoint, and which will be entirely constituted on the notion of potestas, lifted into
the dignified level of rights.
Id. at 287-88.
23 ZARKA, supra note 20, at 5-30.
24 It is important to recall the famous saying by the Dutch jurist, Grotius, according to
whom the Natural Law, which is founded on reasoning, would be true even if God did not
exist.  It is also important to acknowledge that, similar to Francisco de Vito´ria, Grotius is
considered one of the founders of international law and the theory of just war.
25 ZARKA, supra note 20, at 9-11.
26 Zarka calls our attention to this point in Chapter XXVII, § 26 of Locke’s, AN ESSAY
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING:  “Person, as I take it, is the name for this self.
Wherever a man finds what he calls himself, there, I think, another may say is the same
person.  It is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to
intelligent agents, capable of a law, and happiness, and misery.  This personality extends
itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness–whereby it becomes
concerned and accountable; owns and imputes to itself past actions, just upon the same
ground and for the same reason as it does the present.”  1 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERN-
ING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 466-67 (1959).
27 Charles Taylor points out this aspect in the notion of self in Locke, identifying in it what
he calls the “punctual self”:
[T]he detachment of the activities of thought as well as of our desires and irreflective tastes allow
us to view ourselves as objects of profound changes. . . . The subject which can adopt this kind
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as a reward for the best deeds according to some law (mainly the natural
law).28
Zarka argues that Leibniz registers the term as well as the concept of sub-
ject of rights when he corrects a flaw in the notion of person proposed by
Locke.  Following the same path as Grotius, Leibniz identifies the right as
something related to the moral quality of the agent, stressing, however, that the
subject of this quality is a person, a rational substance.  Leibniz examines this
person closely in order to correct Locke.  He demonstrates the continuity of
personal identity, even in the intervals of time in which the person is not con-
scious of herself or of her acts and thoughts, or simply does not remember
them.  Such moments of emptiness can be filled by the testimony of others,
with the possibility of ascribing to the agent the responsibility for her conduct,
even if that agent does not remember it.  With this development, Leibniz adds a
critical inter-subjective focus to the notion of the subject of rights.29
The invention and systematization of the notion of the subject of rights
was a remarkable step in the construction of modern law.  However, it is neces-
sary to go beyond this concept because it is very much linked to a rational and
abstract approach to the person as legal subject and does not address the anthro-
pological diversity of actual persons.  What is missing, then, is an emphasis on
the existential dimension of the subject.
VI. THE EXISTENTIAL DIMENSION OF THE SUBJECT
Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology steps back from the rational
and manipulating subject that became the protagonist of modern thought to
retrieve the existential dimension of the subject.  This is a step back because
there is a change in the focus of the starting point from a rational subject to the
existence of the human person.  Before the formation of thought and self-con-
science, there is something that claims priority of analysis, something so funda-
mental that it cannot even be totally delimited and described by the logos. This
something is, at the same time, the limit and the condition of possibility of a
human person as such, and, consequently, of her rationality.
First, consider the evidence that we are not totally responsible for who we
are, given that we do not decide, in a voluntary manner, our initial references of
of radical posture of detachment with him/herself, looking forward to a change, is what I call
“punctual” self.  To adopt this attitude is to identify with the power of objectifying and redoing
and, through this, to move away from all individual characteristics, which are objects of potential
changes.  What we essentially are is none of what was mentioned, but the thing which is able to
fix and elaborate them.  That is what the image of the point intends to communicate based on the
geometric experience:  the real self   ‘does not have dimension’, it is not anywhere other than in
this capacity of fixing things as objects.
CHARLES TAYLOR ET AL., AS FONTES DO SELF:  A CONSTRUC¸ ˜AO DA IDENTIDADE MODERNA
[T HE SOURCES OF THE SELF:  THE CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN IDENTITY]  223 (1997) (trans-
lated for this Article by Moreira da Silva Filho).
28 As pointed out previously, the model of this rational and moral subject is the proprietor
subject.
29 ZARKA, supra note 20, at 24-30.  This otherness, however, has as its main focus the moral
subject, individually considered with her rational capacities.  It is not really pointed to the
other in her alterity.  The other has the role of fixing the lapses caused by the discontinuity of
memory or personal identity, reestablishing, therefore, the unity lost in these intervals.
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meanings, moods and values.  We are already thrown into our own existence
before we can rationally assess it. Understandings30 and moods31 are never
the result of our own choice; they come before and constitute the condition of
the possibility of the consciousness.32  The human being is thrown into a hori-
zon of meanings that is not chosen or controlled by her, and she is immersed in
temporality, which delimits the possibilities of meaning.  The human being
does not exist before these foundations, rather, she is constituted from them.
The manner in which we conduct our life, the search for purpose that
characterizes human experience, the projecting character of Dasein,33 that is to
say, the project of human existence, always lies behind choices that are made
from a horizon of meanings that constitutes each subjectivity.  From the world
that constitutes her, innumerable possibilities of actions and life projects are
available, such that the character of the person is potentiality-for-Being.  How-
ever, at each moment, we are called to make a choice, and this choice imposes
a sacrifice on us to renounce the possibilities that are excluded from our choice.
Before our choices result in a determinate horizon, there is the moment in
which we project ourselves into them.  These projections come from existence,
a thrownness that we have not chosen, which is the condition of possibility.
We are called to take on the responsibility for our thrown character, which
opens countless possibilities and from which we constantly must choose.  But,
we cannot choose our thrownness.
30 Understanding (Verstehen), which is discussed in MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME
§ 31 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 1962)
(1953), does not refer to some conscious, rational and theoretical notion.  Instead, it refers to
the sense that beings take on, considering their pragmatic and pre-reflexive experience.  It is
clear that the notions and concepts produced by theoretical endeavors and by science at large
enriches this pre-reflective sphere, producing meanings that are adopted but that do not origi-
nate in scientific and theoretical reflection.  The starting point is, therefore, some compre-
hension that is responsible for the inauguration of meaning.
31 Mood (Befindlichkeit), along with understanding, are aspects of being-there (Dasein).
Mood, which is discussed in § 29 of BEING AND TIME, indicates that each being is perceived
not only through a sense that he assumes in relation to the pragmatic experience of purposes
that guide our actions and thoughts, but also in relation to mood (Stimmung), which always
accompanies this sense and affects the interpretation of the being in a specific situation.  The
term, being-there, indicates a state of familiarity with the world. Being-there indicates the
manner of our being-in-the-world, how we are always already in the world.  In addition to
understanding and mood, being-there is structured by discourse (Rede) and decline (Verfal-
len). Id. § 29.
32 John Richardson briefly and precisely explains this idea of being-thrown:  “[T]hat more
general predicament of Dasein which Heidegger refers to as “thrownness” [Geworfenheit]:
we have always already been thrown into our world, and are indeed always ‘in the throw’,
which we can never get back behind.  Not only our moods, but even our understanding, is
something we find ourselves already in, with no possibility of originally producing it.” JOHN
RICHARDSON, EXISTENTIAL EPISTEMOLOGY:  A HEIDEGGERIAN CRITIQUE OF THE CARTESIAN
PROJECT 34 (1986) (boldface type omitted).
33 Heidegger’s Dasein is a substitute for the category of “subject” in philosophy, since it
always points to a human being from the perspective of her existential dimension.  More
details about the concept of Dasein and other Heideggerian terms can be found in JOS ´E
CARLOS MOREIRA DA SILVA FILHO, HERMEN ˆEUTICA FILOS ´OFICA E DIREITO: O EXEMPLO
PRIVILEGIADO DA BOA-F´E OBJETIVA NO DIREITO CONTRATUAL [PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEU-
TICS AND LAW:  THE PRIVILEGED EXAMPLE OF OBJECTIVE GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT LAW]
(2d ed. 2006).
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As this existential aspect of human subjectivity is reinforced, it is possible
to realize that the projects chosen by us (from the horizon that we have not
chosen) can be interrupted at any moment without any explanation or before
being accomplished.  The fundamental interruption is mortality.  The last possi-
bility is the possibility that there will not be any other possibilities available.
This character of being-towards-death makes the existential human aspect even
more intense, broadening the responsibility over the choices made, since there
is insufficient time to explore all of the possibilities available.
Another important point regarding the structure of being-in-the-world is
the fact that the world is always shared with others (being-with-others), that the
inaugural meaning for each person emerges through the world shared with
other human persons.  It is through this fact that it is possible to illuminate for
others aspects of a common world, and vice-versa.  This illumination of what is
common from the Being-with (Mitsein) is called discourse.34
To live with authenticity is to be conscious of this finite and temporal
dimension.  Because it is not easy or comfortable to confront our finitude,
Heidegger uses the term fallingness35 to capture this experience.  According to
this image, we allow ourselves to be absorbed in determinations and meanings
that the anonymous opinion of a certain common sense has established as the
truth.  The falling reveals itself as an escape from the confrontation with our
existential36 limits, preventing us from perceiving them as an original instance
and condition of possibility.  A clear example of falling is the insistence on a
solely rational definition of the human person, as an abstract conception a pri-
ori, developed by modernity as an abstraction of the subject from her own
existence.  It is much more comfortable to have the assumption that we can
explain reality based on theories that are secure and immune to the flux of time.
However, an authentic conception of human person cannot ignore existential
limits because theory itself emerges from these limits and, therefore, cannot
supersede them.37
Consequently, as discourse assumes an authentic format, it urges human
persons to acknowledge in themselves and in others the existential limits from
which they are constituted, enabling the construction of an authentic
community.
34 See HEIDEGGER, supra note 30, § 34.
35 See id. § 38.
36 This escape is evident in the general tendency of getting dispersed with immediate, small
and superficial matters, rather than focusing, experiencing and discussing broader issues and
projects of life.  When we amplify our focus to this broader level, we are closer to facing our
existential limits.
37 John Richardson makes this same point.  It is as if we should use logos to identify and
denounce its own limit, thereby opening ourselves to what is below and beyond, and the
importance of phenomenology.  Richardson states:
The truth of phenomenology, then, will then consist in its capacity to ‘light up’ for its student
those aspects of his Being that falling has inclined him to avoid.  The reader must be helped to
turn himself towards, to confront directly, those features of his Being that he has previously fled;
in particular and most crucially, he must confront the nullities fundamental to that Being, which
are the original motives for flight from it. . . . Phenomenology finds its point in directing its
student towards authenticity, and it is the latter, and not any theoretical system, that constitutes
the existential understanding at which the former ultimately aims.
RICHARDSON, supra note 32, at 194.  The nullities are the existential limits mentioned above.
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It is necessary, still, to emphasize the issue of otherness within these exis-
tential limits, even though this aspect cannot receive the in-depth attention it
deserves in this Article.  For the time being, it is enough to say that, just as it
happens with our thrownness, our projecting character and our being-towards-
death, the other also reveals to herself something that cannot be imprisoned by
theory or totally described by logos.  The other is also a condition of possibility
for the human person and, at the same time, she denounces her finitude.  Any
concept that attempts to explain otherness or to delimit others is unfaithful to
the incommensurability of the face38 of the other.  In view of so many limits,
how can we satisfy ourselves with a conceptual and standardizing apprehension
of subjects?  Among the logical and precise categories of doctrinal legal theo-
ries, is it not necessary for there to be a dimension of uncertainty regarding the
subject that does not suffocate her otherness and her existential character?
VII. FOR AN EXISTENTIAL SUBJECT OF RIGHTS:  THE SUBJECT OF RIGHTS IN
THE CONTEXT OF THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF BRAZIL
Within private law, the movement of “repersonalization” refers to the
necessity that the person regarded as having  rights, duties and obligations, can-
not only be considered as a rational universal, but also must be considered as a
concrete particular.  There are numerous aspects of real life that are related and
that are not included in the functional or abstract extracts of legal theory.39
These aspects can only be perceived in the context of the CONCRETE dimension
of EXISTENCE.
A juridical analysis that justifies the notion of human dignity, understood
in the temporal and finite levels profiled here, cannot be satisfied with a func-
38 The face (Visage) is an important notion by Levinas that delimits the presence of the
other without being the face subsumed in some kind of representation.  The face indicates a
totally different and mysterious reality that can only be found and not represented.
The face is present in its refusal to be contained.  In this sense it cannot be comprehended, that is,
encompassed.  It is neither seen nor touched–for in visual or tactile sensation the identity of the I
envelops the alterity of the object, which becomes precisely a content.
. . . .
. . . The relation between the Other and me, which dawns forth in his expression, issues neither in
number nor in concept.  The Other remains infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign; his face in
which his epiphany is produced and which appeals to me breaks with the world that can be
common to us, whose virtualities are inscribed in our nature and developed by our existence.
EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY 194 (Alphonso Lingis trans., Duquesne Univ.
Press 1969) (1961).
39 This selective, exclusive and abstract characteristic of legal theory is highlighted by Luiz
Edson Fachin in relation to private law, as one of the central arguments of his work, CRITI-
CAL THEORY OF PRIVATE LAW.  Here is an illustrative passage:
The artful system, in such a competent way, attributed to itself the power to dictate the law, and
by doing so, delimited with a thin but effective blade, the law of non-law, thereby excluding
from the system that which does not interest it, like the indigenous relations on the land, the
mode of non-exclusive ownership of property, and life in communion that is not of the given
model.
LUIZ EDSON FACHIN, TEORIA CR´ITICA DO DIREITO CIVIL: ´A LUZ DO NOVO C ´ODIGO CIVIL
BRASILEIRO [CRITICAL THEORY OF PRIVATE LAW]  213 (2000) (translated for this Article by
Moreira da Silva Filho).
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tional concept of the subject in jural relations.40  In an instigative article,
Aguiar emphasizes the theme of alterity in Law, leading the reader beyond the
narrow confines of the modern subject of rights:
The criticism of the depersonalization that scientific discourse raises can also be
extended to legal discourse, which is AN OBLIGATION, a knowledge of control, which
is likely to depersonalize the other as a strategy of rationalizing her existence.  So,
law abstracts the other, turns her into an element in the syntax of jural relations,
removing the possibility of establishing an effective alterity, an opening of oneself to
the other, or the formation of values in the confrontation with the other’s face
. . . .
Today, the increasing disembodiment of the human being makes a greater fluid-
ity of social controls possible, because, besides abstracting the human from existence,
it renders her more apt to quantitative considerations, by alleging objectivity and the
status of truth.  The subject of rights of our Civil Code is the CULMINATING EXPRES-
SION of that view.  The citizen and her dramas and demands exists no more; the
society is no longer cleaved by asymmetries of all genres, but is composed of
detached individuals, each of whom is anonymous and is reduced to legal entities,
despite the separation.  Thus, the official norm expresses itself in contradiction to the
concrete individual, belonging to the given social world.41
The Indian question in Brazil provides an excellent example of the limits of
rational and abstract conceptions of the subject of rights. The difficulty and
violence in seeking to understand indigenous peoples and their specificities
based on the notion of the modern rationalist subject is patent.  Today, Brazil-
ian law, especially since the 1988 Constitution, has faced the challenge of
accepting the consequences of ethnic plurality and has urged its interpreters and
actors to escape the standardized view of the traditional subject of rights.  It is
necessary to cultivate a space in which the concrete and existential peculiarities
of the different subjects who comprise the social whole are able to express
themselves and be recognized by themselves.42  This aim is particularly evident
in the issues relating to indigenous peoples’ rights in Brazil.
40 From this standpoint, the subject is seen as one element of the jural relation.  As Hat-
tenhauer notes, the notion of jural relation, developed by German PANDECTISTICS, no longer
considers the philosophical discussion on the concept of person and her legal projection for
the idea of the subject of right.  The subject is now perceived in her schematic functionality,
for which the specific and peculiar characterizations are irrelevant. See HANS HAT-
TENHAUER, CONCEPTOS FUNDAMENTALES DEL DERECHO CIVIL:  INTRODUCCI ´ON HIST ´ORICO—
DOGM ´ATICA [FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF CIVIL LAW—HISTORICAL-DOGMATIC INTRODUC-
TION]  19-20 (1987); Filho, supra note 1 (an article written by us in which this aspect is
reviewed and further developed).
41 Roberto A.R. de Aguiar, Alteridade e Rede no Direito [Alterity and Net in Law], 3
VEREDAS DO DIREITO, July-Dec. 2006, at 11, 25-26, 32 (Braz.).
42 Discussing multiculturalism, Charles Taylor draws attention to the fact that, in contempo-
rary society, recognition has become a problem because identity is no longer settled by
reference to a cosmic or divine order.  Recognition must be negotiated with the other mem-
bers of society.  Non-recognition or misrecognition threatens an identity seeking to assert
itself, as it induces self-deprecation. See CHARLES TAYLOR ET AL., MULTICULTURALISM,
EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25-74 (1994).
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VIII. THE PARADIGMATIC CHANGE OF THE 1988 CONSTITUTION:  THE
RECOGNITION OF THE BRAZILIAN ETHNIC PLURALITY
The decisive action to dramatically change Indian policy in Brazil, espe-
cially their legal and constitutional status, started with the Brazilian indigenous
people, supported by organizations like the Conselho Indigenista Missiona´rio
[Indigenous Missionary Council] (CIMI).  This new scenario resulted in the
creation of the Unia˜o das Nac¸o˜es Indı´genas [Union of Indigenous Nations]
(UNI) in 1980, which thereafter began to take numerous actions to articulate
and exert pressure on public agencies responsible for indigenous affairs, includ-
ing efforts to recover land, occupations of administrative offices of Fundac¸a˜o
Nacional do ´Indio [NATIONAL INDIAN FOUNDATION]  (FUNAI), and conducting
assemblies and demonstrations.
It was with this spirit and commitment that UNI kept close watch through-
out the constitutional process that culminated in the enactment of the constitu-
tional text on October 5, 1988.  UNI engaged in many activities, including:
submitting and discussing proposals; seeking indigenous representation in the
National Constituent Assembly (which, unfortunately, was unsuccessful); being
present in Brasilia to follow the votes and discussions; lobbying and talking
personally with CONSTITUENT DEPUTIES, covering almost all offices; perform-
ing pajelanc¸as, dances, rituals, and body painting; and making forceful
speeches (like those of Chief Raoni Mentuktire).43  “For the first time in the
history of the country and the Brazilian constitutional process indigenous par-
ticipation in a normative elaboration took place successfully.”44
As a result of these activities, the new constitutional text ended the assimi-
lationist paradigm45 and adopted the recognition of ethnic plurality in Brazil.
The caption of Article 231 of the Federal Constitution reads, “Indians shall
have their social organization, customs, languages, creeds and traditions recog-
nized, as well as their original rights to the lands they traditionally occupy, it
being incumbent upon the Union to demarcate them, protect and ensure respect
for all of their property.”46
The text makes it clear that the specific existence of indigenous people is
not an inferiority to be corrected by imposing legal guardianship with the ulti-
mate goal of cultural assimilation.  Rather, it recognizes the importance of
acknowledging the Brazilian indigenous peoples in their own cultural identities
43 In her study, Rosane Lacerda Freire provides a rich and detailed account of this process,
showing that the conquest of the indigenous peoples of Brazil, consolidated in the unprece-
dented juridical treatment propitiated by the new Constitution, was not without cost.  She
shows that they had to face the opposition of FUNAI for their participation.  Furthermore,
the indigenous peoples were subject to the prejudice of constituents and part of the press that
perceived in the argument for recognition of ethnic diversity as well as indigenous specific-
ity a sort of submission of national sovereignty to hidden multinational forces.  Lacerda,
supra note 15, at 98-148.
44 Id. at 145.
45 The former Constitution, in article 8, subsection XVIII, established that it was for the
Union to legislate on “the incorporation of the forester [indigenous persons] to the national
communion.”
46 CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL art. 231 (2d ed.) (Braz.), availa-
ble at http://bd.camara.gov.br/bd/bitstream/handle/bdcamara/1344/constituicao_ingles_2ed.
pdf?sequence=3.
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and alterity, which implies not only conferring a right, but also recognizing it as
pre-existent to the Brazilian state itself.
Additionally, the following provision, Article 232, establishes that “[t]he
Indians, their communities and organizations have standing under the law to
sue to defend their rights and interests, the Public Prosecutor intervening in all
the procedural acts.”47  It is clear that the indigenous people are no longer per-
ceived as children who require protection through the representation of agen-
cies such as FUNAI, but that indigenous peoples are subjects of their own
history who have full legal capacity.  At the same time, due to their cultural
specificities, and the historical oppression, marginalization and decimation that
Indians have suffered in the process of the formation of the Brazilian constitu-
tional state, it is clear that they do require protection, counseling, and special
rules in order to prevent their fundamental rights and dignity from being disre-
spected and despised.  These measures represent a significant shift away from
the pejorative and prejudiced view that the Indians’ incapacity, immaturity, and
inferiority needed to be “remedied” through assimilation to a “civilized” way of
life.”
The Brazilian Constitution, therefore, opens the door to alterity.  There is a
true act of recognition and respect regarding the values and senses of others not
contained within the western omnipotence of prior legal articulations.  How-
ever, despite this, most legal actors remain insensitive to this change of per-
spective.  Although the 2002 Civil Code does not reproduce the text of the
1916 Civil Code about the relative inability of the “foresters” to perform certain
acts and practices, it refers the matter to a special legislation.  However, in
many cases, the Indian Statute of 1973 is still regarded as this “special legisla-
tion,” completely ignoring the subsequent constitutional text.48  In spite of this
tendency at the national level, it is possible to find examples that go in the
47 Id. at art. 232.
48 This can be seen, for example, in Maria Helena Diniz’s comments on the new Civil Code.
By commenting on the sole paragraph of article 4 of the Code of 2002 (“the Indians’ capac-
ity will be governed by special legislation”), and on an item entitled, “Indı´genas e sua sub-
missa˜o a regime tutelar” [Indigenous and submission tutelary system](emphasis added), the
author says:  “Since the education of indigenous peoples is slow and difficult, they are
placed under the protection of a special law that will govern the issue of their capacity by the
new Civil Code.  The Civil Code, subject them to the guardianship regime, established in
special laws and regulations.” MARIA HELENA DINIZ, CODIGO CIVIL ANOTADO:  DE
ACORDO COM O NOVO CODIGO CIVIL [CIVIL CODE ANNOTATED] 16 (10th. ed. 2004).  What
is most regrettable is that after the passage reproduced above, the author cites not only the
Indian Statute, but also article 231 of the Constitution, not realizing, apparently, any contra-
diction between them.  A similar mistake is made by Gustavo Tepedino, Heloı´sa Helena
Barbosa, and Maria Celina Bodin de Moraes.  In their comments on Article 4, these authors
state:  “As for the indigenous peoples, their capacity is regulated by a special legislation, in
the current framework, the Indian Statute, Law n.6.001/73.  Among the main provisions of
this law, it stands out that . . . the Indians and the indigenous communities that are not
integrated into the national communion are placed under a system of guardianship estab-
lished by that law (Article 7).” GUSTAVO TEPEDINO, HELOISA HELENA BARBOZA, MARIA
CELINA BODIN DE MORAES, C ´ODIGO CIVIL INTERPRETADO:  CONFORME A CONSTITUIC¸ ˜AO DA
REP ´UBLICA [CIVIL CODE INTERPRETED ACCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC]
15 (2004) (emphasis added).  Unfortunately, the conquest of indigenous peoples in the Bra-
zilian Constitution is largely unnoticed by most Brazilian jurists.
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opposite direction at more local levels.  Here we will give closer attention to
one of these examples:  the case of Morro do Osso (Bone Hill) in Porto Alegre.
IX. MORRO DO OSSO: HISTORY OF A CONQUEST
On April 9, 2004, a small group of Kaingang families occupied a region of
the South Zone of Porto Alegre called Morro do Osso (Bone Hill). This is a
place of great natural beauty and rich biodiversity, from which one can view
the Guaı´ba river and part of the city.  In 1998, the site had been expropriated
and transformed by the municipality into an ecological park:  the Natural Park
of Morro do Osso.  The park is ringed by several homes and luxury condomini-
ums, indicating the interest of local land developers in this area.  One month
after the occupation, the Indians filed SUIT,49 seeking recognition of the tradi-
tional occupation of the area by the Kaingang, and an order in favor of the
community’s rights pursuant to article 231, paragraph 1 of the 1988 Brazilian
Constitution.
On December 07, 2005, the Municipality of Porto Alegre filed a posses-
sory action50 against the Kaingang Community of Morro do Osso, seeking their
removal from the site.  At first, the preliminary order was partially granted.
The judge ordered the wooden houses built within the park to be removed. The
Indians, therefore, opted to leave, but they established camp near the access
road to the park, since their presence at the site was the only effective instru-
ment of pressure they had on behalf of their claim.
After hearing both parties, the Federal Judge Candido Silva Alfredo Leal
Junior issued a preliminary order for the reintegration of possession by the
municipality and the withdrawal of the community from the park and its sur-
roundings within thirty days.  The Department of Justice promptly filed an
interlocutory appeal against that decision and obtained a stay due to an immi-
nent judicial recess.51  Finally, on September 07, 2006, the appeal was granted
and the writ of entry required by the municipality was dismissed in an eloquent
opinion by Judge Ma´rcio Antoˆnio Rocha, of Tribunal Regional Federal
[REGIONAL FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS]-(TRF) of the 4th Region.52
What is to be emphasized here, however, is the contrast in the manner in
which the facts and events surrounding this case are perceived.  There are two
very different ways of dealing with and understanding the indigenous issue.  It
is important to highlight this aspect of the case in light of the need to achieve
the constitutional spirit of respect for the ethnic and cultural diversity of Brazil-
ian society, mainly through its public institutions.
49 Juı´zo Federal da Vara Ambiental, Agra´ria e Residual [J.F.] [Federal judge of agrarian and
environmental and Residual jurisdiction] of Porto Alegre No. 2004.71.00.021504-0 (Brazil).
50 Juı´zo Federal da Vara Ambiental, Agra´ria e Residual [J.F.] [Federal judge of agrarian and
environmental and Residual jurisdiction] of Porto Alegre No. 2005.71.00.023683-6 (Brazil).
51 R.T.R.F.4 [Regional Federal Court of Appeals of the 4th Region], No.
2005.04.01.052760-4 (Brazil).
52 Despite the dismissal of the preliminary order, the action for reintegration is still in pro-
gress before the Federal Judiciary.  On June 29, 2007 an unfavorable ruling was handed
down to the Indian community, leading to an appeal to the REGIONAL FEDERAL COURT OF
APPEALS of the 4TH REGION ON AUGUST 3, 2009.
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Thus, on the one hand, there is the position of City Hall, part of the Fed-
eral Judiciary, the residents of the South Zone, and some newspapers that, by
reporting the fact, emphasized a biased point of view.  Here is the summary of
the main elements:  the presence of Indians in the Park is a threat to the preser-
vation of the environment; the coexistence with the Indians is dangerous and
undesirable, and brings misery and filth to the neighborhood; the existing evi-
dence about the former Indian occupation, which would underlie the tradition,
is better associated to Guaranis rather than to Kaingangs; and this Kaingang
community can perfectly settle in another region already designated for Indian
occupation by the State Government.53
On the other hand, there is the position of the Kaingang community, led
by:  the articulate and engaged Cacique (Chief) Jaime; the Department of Jus-
tice; federal organs responsible for indigenous interests, like FUNASA and the
nucleus of Indigenous Health of  the Public Health School of RS; the portion of
the federal judiciary and other sectors that have supported the struggle of this
community, such as the Nu´cleo de Antropologia das Sociedades Indı´genas e
Tradicionais da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul–[Anthropology
Center of Traditional and Indigenous Societies of the Federal University of Rio
Grande do Sul] - NIT/UFRGS.54
Based on what we can gather from the judicial records, as well as the
conversations held with the Chief and some members of the tribe, the case is
justified by the combination of very special factors that take into account, fun-
damentally, the traditions and the spirituality of the Kaingang ethnicity.  How-
ever, from the “white man’s” point of view, it is very difficult to understand the
fundamental link that Indians have with the land, since this view is based on the
western legal concept of abstract ownership of property that corresponds to an
abstract understanding of the subject of rights.
The Kaingang ethnicity attributes a priceless value to the land where their
ancestors were buried.  Living in the land where the dead were buried is a key
element to their way of life.  Guided by shamanism, they receive spiritual and
practical guidance from dreams and the Shaman’s contact with their ancestors.
Thus, it is not merely a problem of having or not having land to live and pro-
duce, but of being able to live in a specific land that holds fundamental mean-
ing for them.  For the Community of Morro do Osso, the land in question has a
sacred sense, confirmed by the Shaman.  Moreover, the place is an important
element of tradition that is transmitted orally in the Community.  There is no
point, therefore, in proposing that they move to other lands that do not have
such meaning for them; moreover, those lands are already occupied by the
Guarani, whose tradition is very different from that of the Kaingang.
By associating the notion of the subject of rights to the context of the
implementation of indigenous rights, which in this case is related to property
rights, we can perceive the crucial role of hermeneutics.  First, this approach
takes into account the pre-understanding and existential character that sustains
the claims of this indigenous group.  Second, such an attitude requires a will-
53 The judicial records of this suit clearly show that South Zone residents, some newspapers,
City Hall and the Federal Court Judge present this point of view.
54 The judicial records show these opinions as well.
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ingness on the part of legal officials interpreting the law to “open their hori-
zons.”55  Third, the legal dispute is mediated by the problematic interpretation
of the legal text, and, more specifically, the constitutional text.
When CF/88 in Article 231 grants to the Indians “original rights to the
lands they traditionally occupy,” one must ask what criteria will be used to
define these traditional lands.  The white man (i.e., Western society) has histor-
ically been the one who has always determined such original rights, but why
not look to the indigenous peoples?  For them, their oral tradition and the gui-
dance of their spiritual leaders are much more important than archaeological
and historiographic evidence produced by Western scientists.
It should be noted that the constitutional text makes clear the need of using
the criteria given by traditions and indigenous cultures when defining the lands
they “traditionally” occupy.  The first paragraph of Article 231, with emphasis
added, establishes that “the lands traditionally occupied by the Indians are those
in which they live on a permanent basis, they use for their productive activities
that are essential for the conservation of environmental resources necessary for
their well-being and for their physical and cultural reproduction, according to
their uses, customs and traditions.”
Even without these considerations, in light of western scientific criteria
there are elements that reinforce the appeal of the Kaingang Indigenous Com-
munity in this case.  Antique tools tailored in the bamboo tradition associated
with Kaingangs were found by a team of archeologists from UFRGS at the site.
Additionally, accounts of their oral history indicating the existence of ancestors
on the site have been confirmed by independent means.
Furthermore, it is now evident that, as the judge of the REGIONAL FEDERAL
COURT OF APPEALS rightly pointed out two years after the occupation, the
alleged damage that will be caused to the environment has not in fact occurred.
After all, if there is any culture that threatens the integrity of the environment, it
is the Western culture, not the culture of Indians-Brazilian native people, whose
relationship with the land is sacred.  The Indians do not need rules to protect
the environment; a zeal for respecting nature is an inherent element of their
culture.56  Unfortunately, we can not say the same about the “civilized white
man.”
55 Here, one should recall that Gadamer states that those who are willing to engage in genu-
ine interpretation must be prepared for the possibility that they might change their opinions.
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, VERDADE E M´ETODO:  TRAC¸OS FUNDAMENTAIS DE UMA
HERMEN ˆEUTICA FILOS ´OFICA [TRUTH AND METHOD]  405 (Fla´vio Paulo Meurer trans., 1997).
56 Chief Jaime Ke¨ntha´nh Alves, leader of the Kaingang community of Morro do Osso, in
the Relato´rio Azul [Blue Report] of the Assemble´ia Legislativa do Rio Grande do Sul [Leg-
islative Assembly of Rio Grande do Sul], adds the following:  “regarding the environment,
FUNAI has set up projects within indigenous lands over the years in accordance with their
interests, and ended up leaving these lands exhausted and degraded.  The fish, animals, trees,
water and the land are sick.  These projects, were conceived without regard to Article 231,
which refers to the indigenous right to the environment and preserved natural resources, as to
which the Indians have the exclusive right of use.  Today, in Rio Grande do Sul, it is difficult
for indigenous peoples to maintain their traditional systems of healing, shamanism, educa-
tion, and traditional food due to the environmental degradation of our territory.  Therefore,
we are shocked when they say they fear that the Kaingang will harm the environment in
Morro do Osso.  This argument is false, because we are the most interested in the preserva-
tion of the fields and forests, for it is from this nature that we live, we are this nature!  In
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X. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The reflections in this Article were intended to develop, even if briefly, the
four important aspects reinforced by the idea of repersonalization of Civil Law:
to transform the comprehension of modern Civil Law by debating two of its
fundamental notions:  the notion of subject of rights and subjective right; to
rescue a philosophical-moral dimension of the notion of person projected in the
law; carrying this out, however, without losing sight of the concrete, relational
and existential dimension of human life, which comes before any abstract rep-
resentation of the person; and, finally, to perceive that such focus is the most
vital result of a new constitutionalism, which looks forward to the construction
of a democratic state of law in which the word “democratic” refers to opening
our legal representations.  The law must be open to that which is always
changeable, existential and different, confident that democracy is a communal
relation that allows for contact with different peoples without considering them
inferior or irrelevant, or, even worse, as something that goes unnoticed because
it is suffocated.
The example of indigenous people in Brazil points out, in a privileged
way, the issues mentioned above, because it has a strong exteriority and, at the
same time, a closeness relation with Brazilian roots.  Decisions such as the one
in the aforementioned interlocutory appeal show how it is possible for Brazilian
legal actors to give up on a narrow and intolerant view of the legal system and
open themselves to an understanding of law that is able to deal with multiple
communities that constitute Brazil, noting that difference does not mean weak-
ness or inferiority.  Instead, difference is a sign of an alterity to be respected in
its inapprehensible mystery.  More than understanding, it requires recognition
and respect.  This is the ultimate lesson of hermeneutics.
Porto Alegre we see luxury condominiums being built on forests that are cleared daily.  And
society does not say anything against that.” RELAT ´ORIO AZUL:   GARANTIAS E VIOLAC¸ ˜OES
DOS DIREITOS HUMANOS (2006), Rio Grande Do Sul, Assemble´ia Legislativa, Comissa˜o de
Cidadania e Direitos Humanos [Blue Report:  Guarantee and Violations of Human Rights
(2006), Rio Grande do Sul, The Commission of Human Rights and Citizenship of the State
Legislature] 107 (translated for this Article by Moreira da Silva Filho).
